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MICHIGAN ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
ACT OF 19701
I.

INTRODUCTION

Widespread public preoccupation with environmental quality is
a recent development, and one that has provided the impetus for a
thorough examination of existing governmental structures in order
to establish a functional system for the environment's protection
and improvement. Commenting on this development, a leading
environmental lawyer recently noted: "[T]he explosion of concern
for the environment, at every private and governmental level, is
the great political phenomenon of the last twelve months." 2 As
concern has grown about the quality of the environment, so too
has skepticism increased about the ability of present institutions
to cope with the problem. 3 A constitutional amendment has even
been suggested as a necessary prerequisite to adequate protective
4
measures.
One of the principal sources of disillusionment with the responsiveness of governmental bodies to environmental problems is the
reaction of administrative agencies to the introduction of this new
area of public interest as a factor in the agency decision-making
process. 5 Many agencies are viewed as being too closely associated with the interests of the industries and activities that are in
theory being regulated to effectively balance opposing priorities. 6
I MicH. COMP. LAWS § § 691.1201-691.1207 (Supp. 1970). This Act incorporates the
provisions of a model bill drafted by Joseph L. Sax, Professor of Law, University of
Michigan, for the Western Michigan Environmental Action Council.
2 Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness ofAdministrative
Law, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 612 (1970).
3 See, for example, Ottinger, Legislation and the Environment: Individual Rights and
Government Accountability, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 666 (1970); Hildebrand, Noise Pollution: An Introduction to the Problem and an Outline for Future Legal Research, 70
COLUM. L. REV. 652, 655 (1970).
4Ottinger, supra note 3, at 671- 672.
5
See Office of Communications of the United Church of Christ v. Federal Communications Commission, 359 F.2d 994, 1003- 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1966) granting standing to
members of the listening public to intervene in and challenge the re-licensing of a local
television station by the FCC, in vindication of the public interest.
6 An extreme illustration of this problem is found in structure of the Interior Department, commented upon by Ottinger, supra note 3, at 670:
Furthermore, the Interior Department is by design a truly schizoid agency.
Despite its environmental responsibilities, however tenuous they might be,
the agency is also the biggest developer and exploiter of natural resources in
the United States. Among other things, it is the largest single producer of
electric power, a licenser of offshore drilling, and a dam builder and developer second only, perhaps, to the Corps of Engineers. It is not surprising,
therefore, that Interior's concern for environmental protection is overshadowed by its obligations to the opposition.

Journal of Law Reform

(VOL. ,4:1

Commenting on this point, Professor Joseph L. Sax of the University of Michigan Law School recently stated:
Official agencies which are created to promote and protect
the public interest sometimes become too single-minded. In
the past few years, a number of cases have brought home the
degree to which important regulatory agencies failed to take
into account all the information and all the perspectives
7
which a proper regard for the public interest required.
For this reason, many see private litigation and the active involvement of the courts in the environmental area as the only
means of effecting any significant change in agency policy decisions.8
Obtaining a judicial determination of the issue, however, is
traditionally contingent upon two factors: the standing of the
plaintiff to bring the suit, and the willingness of the court to
entertain the action. The doctrine of standing, although flexible 9
and "determined by the specific circumstances of individual
cases," 10 does require that a party have a "personal stake"' 1 in
the disposition of the case. This limitation has created problems
2
for groups not alleging the invasion of a private right.1
Courts have also been hesitant to take jurisdiction of the subject matter absent a specific legislative authorization,' 1 3 especially
where the protection of the interest involved has been conferred
on a public agency. 1 4 This note will discuss the provisions of one
such legislative authorization, its basis in previous common law
i Testimony of Joseph L. Sax before the Committee on Conservation and Recreation,
House of Representatives of Michigan, on H.B. 3055, January 21, 1970.
8 Sive, supra note 2, at 615, 650; Comment, Private Remedies for Water Pollution, 70
COLUM. L. REV. 734, 735, 752 (1970).
9
See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (granting standing to a taxpayer to challenge an
exercise of the congressional taxing and spending power, where it was alleged that the
enactment in question exceeded specific constitutional limitations on that power).
10United States ex rel. Chapman v. Federal Power Commission, 345 U.S. 153, 156
(1953), granting standing to the Secretary of the Interior and others to institute proceedings under the Federal Power Act to set aside an order of the Federal Power Commission,
at the same time finding that the license was issued in a valid exercise of authority.
1 Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150
(1970), where standing was granted to petitioners, who, as data processing manufacturers,
challenged a ruling by the comptroller of the currency that allowed national banks to make
data processing services available to other banks and customers. Although the petitioners
alleged economic damage as their personal interest, Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the
Court, states that "the interest, at times, may reflect 'aesthetic, conservational, and,
recreational' as well as economic values," at 154.
12 See Comment, Equity and the Eco-System: Can Injunctions Clear the Air?, 68 MICH.
L. REV. 1254, 1275, (1970).
13Testimony of Joseph L. Sax before the Committee on Commerce, United States
Senate Subcommittee on Energy, Environment and Natural Resources on S. 3575, Environmental
Protection Act of 1970, May 13_ 1970.
14 Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 473, 498 (1970).
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decisions, its qualitative differences from those decisions, and its
potential functioning.
II.

MAJOR PROVISIONS OF THE ACT

The Michigan Act serves two primary functions in relation to
the field of environmental litigation. First, it explicitly recognizes
and expands a legal interest in the protection of the environment,
enforcible either by state or local governments or by private
citizens. Second, it establishes a framework for the assertion of
this interest within the context of judicial proceedings.
The Act specifically provides for the maintenance of a civil
action in the circuit court for declaratory and equitable relief by
any "legal entity," 15 public or private, against any other legal
entity for the "protection of the air, water and other natural
resources and the public trust therein from pollution, impairment
or destruction. " 16 It also authorizes intervention in any administrative proceeding whose subject matter has environmental implications and judicial review of the agency decision on the filing of a
pleading asserting actual or potential pollution, impairment or
destruction. 17 Consequently, these two provisions, in addition to
conferring jurisdiction on the courts, enable the commencement of
class actions and the bringing of actions against the state.
In the first stage of litigation in a suit brought under the Act,
the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing that the conduct of
the defendant has violated, or is likely to violate, the interest
created.' 8 The defendant then has two options: (1) to rebut the
plaintiff's case by the submission of evidence to the contrary; or
(2) to raise the affirmative defense that there is no "feasible and
prudent alternative"' 19 to the conduct in question, and that the
conduct is "consistent with the promotion of the public health,
safety and welfare in light of the state's paramount concern for the
protection of its natural resources from pollution, impairment or
destruction. ' 20 In weighing the relative merits, the circuit courts
apply the standard principles of burden of proof and weight of the
evidence generally used in civil actions.
In entertaining an action brought under the Environmental Pro15 MicH. COMP. LAWS §691.1202 (I)

provides that an action may be brought by: the

attorney general, any political subdivision of the state, any instrU mentality or agency of the
state or of a political subdivision thereof, any person, partnership, corporation, association.
organization or other legal entity.
MICH. COMP. LAWS §691.1202 (I) (Supp. 1970).
17 MicH. COMP. LAWS §691.1205 (1) (Supp. 1970).
'8 MICH. COMP. LAWS §691.1203 (I) (Supp. 1970).
16

19 Id.
20

Id.
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tection Act, the court is authorized to choose between alternative
means of arriving at a final disposition of the case. It may try the
case directly, taking evidence and making an adjudication on the
merits, 2 1 or it may appoint a technically qualified master or referee to take testimony and report his findings to the court. 22 The
court also has the option of remitting the case to available administrative proceedings for a determination of the legality of the
defendant's conduct, retaining jurisdiction of the action pending
completion of the proceedings for the purpose of ascertaining
whether adequate protection has indeed been provided. 23 In any
event, where the circuit court chooses to exercise its original
jurisdiction, it shall retain jurisdiction for the purposes of judicial
review of all later administrative proceeding, contrary provisions
of the Administrative Procedures Act of 196924 notwithstand25
ing.
The circuit court also has a number of options available in
fashioning the type of relief which it may grant. If an agency
standard is challenged, the court is authorized to evaluate its
validity and applicability, determine whether a standard is deficient, and direct the adoption of a standard specified and approved by the court. 26 It has the power to grant permanent equitable relief, 27 or to grant temporary equitable relief, appropriate,
for instance, when a case has been remitted to administrative
proceedings. 28 Moreover, the court has the further option of imposing conditions on the defendant in order to insure adequate
protection of the environment. 29 Where there has been intervention in, or judicial review of, administrative proceedings, no
conduct shall be approved which is likely to have the effect of
pollution, impairment or destruction of natural resources if there
30
is a feasible and prudent alternative.
On the other hand, the Act has empowered the court to take
steps designed to protect defendants from spurious claims or a
-multiplicity of suits. Thus, the court may order the plaintiff to post
a bond, not to exceed $500.00, to insure payment of any cost or
judgment which might be rendered against him, 3 1 and, if the

21 Id.
22 MICH. COMp. LAWS §691.1203 (2) (Supp. 1970).
2 MICH. COMP. LAWS §691.1204 (2) (Supp. 1970).
24
Administrative Procedures Act of 1969, MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 24.201 to 24.313
(Supp. 1970).
2 MICH. COMP. LAWS §691.1204 (4) (Supp. 1970).
28 MICH. CoMP. LAWS §691.1202 (2) (Supp. 1970).
27 MICH. CoMP. LAWS §691.1204 (2) (Supp. 1970).
28 MICH. COMP. LAWS §691.1204 (1) (Supp. 1970).

2 id.
30 MICH. Comp. LAWS §691.1205 (2) (Supp. 1970).
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interests of justice require, costs may be apportioned to the parties. 3 2 In addition, the court's use of res judicata and collateral
estoppel is sanctioned by the Act in order to prevent multiplicity
of suits.

33

Finally, to emphasize that judicial proceedings are not intended
to substitute for the established agency framework, the Act specifically provides that its provisions are supplementary to existing
34
administrative and regulatory procedures.

111.

EVALUATION

A. A Legal Basis of the Right in the Environment
Recognition of a new interest inevitably presents initial
difficulties inhering in the constitutional "case" or "controversy"
limitation on judicial power.3 5 This requisite dictates that each
party must assert a definable interest and have a sufficient involvement in the outcome to insure an adequate presentation of
the issue in the adversary context necessary for proper judicial
determination. It has been held that while a statute cannot create
a "case" or "controversy," new interests or rights can be created
by legislation, thereby granting standing to one who, without the
legal recognition of the interest, would be barred by the lack of
"case" or "controversy. ' 3 6 This analysis of the function of "interest" provides a useful framework for an examination of the
basis for a man's right in a safe environment. A grant of standing
independent of a definable interest must be invalid for lack of a
"case" or "controversy," but if the foundation of the right can be
found in the previous recognition of similar rights, then the act of
the legislature can be seen as only clarifying, expanding, and

32

MIcH. COMp. LAWS §691.1202a (Supp. 1970).
MICH. COMp. LAWS §691.1203 (3) (Supp. 1970).

33

MicH. CoMp. LAWS §691.1205 (3) (Supp. 1970).

31

34 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 691.1206 (Supp. 1970).

35 U.S. CONST. art. I1, §2. Although the Michigan Constitution does not incorporate
the same "case" or "controversy" limitation (see art. VI, § 1),the federal standards have
been largely followed by Michigan decisional law. See Hodge v. Pontiac Township Board,
363 Mich. 544, 110 N.W.2d 746 (1961), holding that courts will not take cognizance of

suits instituted merely to obtain judicial opinions on points of law and where persons
invoking the jurisdiction have not shown a personal grievance or an adverse affect upon
their personal or property rights; Attorney General ex rel. McRae v. Thompson, 167

Mich. 507, 133 N.W. 532 (1911), holding that the court will not adjudicate academic
questions or "what the decision would be were the controversy presented upon a given

state of facts," Id. at 513; Horowitz v. Rott, 235 Mich. 369, 209 NW. 131 (1926), holding
that the court cannot review a satisfied judgment (a moot case), and that it is beyond the

power of the legislature to confer jurisdiction to hear moot cases.
36 Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Commission, 354 F.2d
608, 615 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1965). See text accompanying footnotes
52- 56 infra.
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authorizing the assertion of an existing group of interests in a
broader context.
A somewhat similar right, and one from which the right to a
safe environment is arguably an expansion and extension, is that
to the quiet "use and enjoyment of land;" '3 7 interference with this
right constitutes the tort of nuisance. A private nuisance action is
based on property rights and may be brought by a landowner
whose personal rights in his own land have been invaded by the
conduct of another. 3 8 Implicit in the protection of this interest by
the courts is the recognition that a nontrespassory invasion of an
individual's rights can exist, and that some activities, even when
conducted exclusively within the confines of a person's property
and not illegal per se, constitute an infringement of the rights of
others.
A second similar right is that of citizens in the proper administration of land by government for the public trust. 39 Frequently,
the cases relying on this doctrine deal with resource management
and the responsibility of government to the public interest in the
utilization and disposition of publicly held land. 40 Based in part on
the theory that there are traditional uses reserved to the public, it
establishes a precedent for the as-sertion that individual citizens
have an inherent interest in natural resources and the use thereof
and that such an interest can be protected by judicial intervention.
An additional right, partly substantive and partly procedural, is
that interest of the public in the proper functioning of governmental agencies. Formalized by the Federal Administrative
Procedure Act 41 and similar state statutes, 4 2 private citizens have
been allowed to intervene in administrative proceedings and to
obtain judicial review of those processes. Although these agencies
have been entrusted with the regulation of given activities and
protection of the public interest therein, the ability of private
citizens to make demands on these institutions establishes an
implicit recognition of an obligation to be responsive to the public's view of its own interest and to be directly accountable to the
public through the courts for decisions, actions and policies.
Thus, the combination of these three separate interests pro37

Prosser,PrivateActionfor a Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REV. 997 (1966).

38 Id. at 999.

39See Sax, supra note 14.
40

See Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892), (holding a
grant to the railroad of almost the entire Chicago waterfront area to be beyond the power
of the Illinois Legislature, in that it was an abdication of its police power responsibility.
41 5 U.S.C. §701 et seq. (1967).

2See, for example, MICH. COMP. LAWS § § 24.201 to 24.313 (Supp. 1970).
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vides a basis for the emergence of a new interest in the protection
of the environment and a theoretical background for its development. Although none of the three deals with the same area or
means of protection, extrapolation of the principles involved gives
substance to the significance of the new interest and furnishes
criteria which may prove useful for future adjudications. The
importance of this is seen in the need for judicial standards by
which to evaluate an interest within the context of a case. Balancing the competing interests in a case and arriving at an adjudication on the merits is dependent upon the application of "judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it."' 4 Given
this necessity, the availability of a logical nexus with similar
interests is particularly significant.
In this regard, the development of the law of privacy provides a
useful analogy. By means of the formal recognition of an existing
right, 44 a forum for its protection was created and courts were
authorized to determine definitions and boundaries within the
framework of its evolution. 4 5 There are fundamental differences
between statutory and constitutional recognition of a right, but the
analogy is valid in terms of the utilization of precedent in considering the meaning of a new right.
The Michigan Environmental Protection Act, therefore, can be
seen as a progression in the development of the protection of a
right, a culmination signified by a legislative codification and expansion of a recognizable group of interests. , This substantive
foundation of the new right continues to provide the standards
and form necessary to its validity, while its assertion is made
possible in a broader context.
B. Past Review of Administrative Proceedings
Of primary significance is the fact that the Act removes many
limitations which previously prohibited the full enjoyment of the
rights involved. For instance, even though the legislature has
recently recognized the right to intervene in and obtain judicial
review of administrative proceedings, this recognition has been of
limited utility.
In most cases review of administrative proceedings has extend43 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
4See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), holding unconstitutional Connecticut statutes prohibiting the use of contraceptives, as an invasion of the privacy of the
marriage relationship.
4See Comment, Toward a Constitutionally Protected Environment, 56 VA. L. REV.
458,464-467 (1970).
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ed only to the consideration of procedural questions and an evaluation of the agency's performance in terms of its statutory function. An example of this type of limited review is found in Citizens' Committee for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 4 6 a case involving an attempt by a group of citizens to prevent the construction of a six-lane highway along the Hudson River. Standing in
the action was based on the Administrative Procedure Act 4 7 and
the statutory requirements, which established the necessary public interest, that consideration be given by the agency to environ-7
mental concerns. 48 The focus of the trial, 49 however, was on the
issue of whether a part of the proposed expressway was a dike,
the construction of which would require Congressional approval
under an 1899 statute. 50 Although the court set aside the agency
action as being in excess of statutory authority, 5 1 its holding did
not go beyond insisting upon the fulfillment of procedural requirements, failing to reach the issue of environmental protection.
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power
Commission,5 2 which involved the licensing of an electric power
plant on an unusually scenic section of the Hudson River, provides another example of judicial reticence in reviewing administrative agency decisions. Considered a landmark case because of
its allowance of standing 53 and its discussion of the policy questions involved in environmental determinations, the decision was
still limited to an evaluation of the agency's action within the
framework of specific statutory provisions. Relying on language in
the Federal Power Act, 54 the court held, that to be valid, the

Federal Power Commission's action must be based on a complete
46 425 F.2d 97 (2 Cir. 1970).
47 5 U.S.C. §702 (1967) provides:

A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.
48 Department of Transportation Act of 1966, as amended by § 18 (b) of the Act of
August 23, 1968, 82 Stat. 824, 49 U.S.C. § 1653 (f) (Supp. IV); The Hudson River Basin

,

Compact Act, P.L. 89-605, 80 Stat. 847 (1966).
49 Citizens' Committee for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 302 F.Supp. 1083 (S.D. N.Y. -- ,'.,

1969).
50 Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, §9, 30 Stat. 115 1,33 U.S.C. §401 (1967).
51Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1967).
52 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965).
53 Contra, see Sierra Club v. Hickel, No. 24, 966 (9th Cir. Sept. 16, 1970), which
denied standing to the plaintiff, stating, "The question of standing here must be decided
from the facts in this action," at 12. The court held that the plaintiff had not shown a
sufficiently direct interest (there was no allegation of property damage, that the organization or its members were endangered or that its status was threatened), nor the requisite
connection between the official action and a legally protected interest, and that it had not
sufficiently alleged that it was aggrieved within the meaning of a relevant statute. The court
distinguished the Scenic Hudson case on the grounds that there was no statute in the
present case giving standing to aggrieved parties.
54 16 U.S.C. §803 (a) (1964).
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record, which includes a co.nsideration of all "relevant factors"
and "a thorough study of possible alternatives to the Storm King
project." 55 The holding's significance should not be ignored, since
it served at least to delay the construction of the project, but the
limited utility of this approach is evidenced by the fact that a new
authorization for the Storm King project has recently been issued
by the Commission. 56 As a result, either renewed litigation will be
necessary or the ultimate goal sought by the plaintiff-to prevent
the destruction of a scenic wilderness by the building of a power
plant-will be unattainable.
The limitations illustrated by these two cases are typical of the
problems faced by individuals attempting to assert a right to the
protection of the environment without the aid of specific legislative authorization. First, the only relief available is a remand of
the proceeding to the administrative agency, which, by complying
with the procedural standards set by the court, can reach the same
determination as in the previous hearing. Second, the cases which
have been successful have dealt almost entirely with the licensing
of new projects and not with the imposition of new regulations on
the conduct of existing activities. Third, cases which have allowed
even this limited degree of review have been almost exclusively in
the federal courts and have dealt with standards set by federal
legislation. Because of the narrow field of permissible inquiry,
courts have not arrived at the point of making a determination on
the merits of any given controversy, but have had to rely on
purely technical grounds to protect the underlying interests involved.
Consequently, one of the most significant advantages of the Act
is that actions brought under it will present the environmental
issues directly to the courts. Litigation will be framed in terms of
the consequences of concrete examples of threats to the environment and factual evidence relating to those threats will be the
basis of adjudication. A practical outgrowth of this development is
the statute's requirement that the issues be presented in a clearly
defined manner, drawn narrowly enough to allow the application
of standards which in and of themselves are only vaguely defined.
C. Absence of JudicialStandards
The fact that the Act does not set forth standards for the courts
to employ in reaching decisions should also serve to facilitate the
assertion of one's right in the environment. In the absence of
55 354 F.2d at 612.
56 N.Y. Times, Aug.

20, 1970, § 1,at 1,col. 1.
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enumerated standards, the court is allowed a certain responsiveness to the individual characteristics of each action and can
make a case-by-case determination without the constraint of
over-precise formulas. One of the deficiencies of narrow legislative standards in this area is that it is virtually impossible to
foresee all the different types of environmental pollution that may
develop with later changes in technology. In view of this, private
litigation and the careful use of expert testimony 5 7 can best serve
the function of giving definition to the general language in existing
statutes and regulations. 58 If prudent and extensive use of expert
testimony is made, the courts may prove to be more responsive to
rapidly changing environmental technology than legislatures and
administrative agencies. 59 It may thus be possible for private
citizens with the aid of the courts to prevent irreparable harm in
some instances, and to keep impairment of the environment within reasonable limits in others.
An important aspect of any system of regulation, whether judicially, legislatively or administratively imposed, is consistency
and coordination. 60 In attempting to enforce loosely articulated
interests, the Environmental Protection Act may result in a divergence in end results and an unequal imposition of conditions for
compliance, and, to this extent, consistency and coordination may
be sacrificed. Because of the number of different courts that will
be trying cases brought under the Act, the wide variety of
plaintiffs and their presentation of the issues and evidence, and
the existence of like problems in different situations, very similar
types of conduct could produce highly dissimilar dispositions.
Moreover, since all activity with identical effects will not be
challenged, the likelihood is that higher standards will be imposed
only on those unfortunate enough to have been brought to court.
The primary reason for this potential discrepancy in result is
the difficulty involved in the rapid development of common law
standards for a previously unlitigated interest. As of October 1,
1970, the circuit courts must make determinations using criteria
that as yet have not been applied directly. Although judicially
created rules will develop in time, the creation of these standards
will impose a heavy initial burden on the courts, and the judicial
ability to handle this task may well control the efficacy of the
legislation. Still, precedent from cases involving the traditional
interests from which the interest in a safe environment evolve,
57 See Toward a Constitutionally Protected Environment, supra note 45, at 477.
58

See Equity and the Eco-System, supra note 12, at 1260.

59 See Equity and the Eco-System, supra note 12, at 1261-1262.

60 See Ottinger, supra note 3, at 672.
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and policy and regulatory provisions of other legislation could
provide a basis for the emergence of a doctrinal foundation for the
definition of the new interest.
D. Variety ofActions and Remedies
In addition to providing the courts with flexibility in developing
enforcement standards, the Act permits a variety of actions to be
brought under its provisions, ranging from a suit questioning the
legality of an individual's conduct to a challenge of an industry-wide procedure or a demand for specific state action. This
characteristic of the legislation constitutes an implicit recognition
of the fact that protection of the environment does not consist of
controlling specific activities determined to be harmful in advance,
but rather of balancing competing interests in terms of their actual
effect on the public welfare taken in its totality.
Legislative recognition of the demands that this diversity of
claims will place on the judicial system is found in the flexibility of
procedures established for adjudication. The options available to
the courts, from the aspect of procedure and relief, are designed
to create a realistic judicial structure which is responsive to the
peculiar problems involved in this field of litigation. While the
court maintains the power of ultimate determination, it may take a
variety of intermediate steps depending upon the existence of
administrative proceedings for the evaluation of that type of interest, the technical nature of the problem, the extent of the
effects of the activity in question, or any of a number of variables
which define the issues in a given case. The flexibility of relief
functions analogously: conduct may be prohibited or regulated so
as to make it conform to standards found acceptable by the court
after it weighs the evidence presented in a true adversary context.
This power of the courts to frame relief can also serve as an
impetus to administrative agencies to reassess their own decisions
within the context of a fuller consideration of environmental concerns. As Professor Sax has pointed out, "[p]ublic intervention
may help to strengthen the resolve of an agency which is under
pressure from interested parties, or it may encourage an agency to
reconsider a problem it has ignored or held too long in abeyance." 61 As the development and enforcement of adequate agency
standards would have a greater effect than a case-by-case granting
of relief by the courts,6 2 this would be a very satisfactory consequence of judicial determinations of suits in this area.
61 Testimony
62

of Joseph L. Sax before the Senate Subcommittee, supra note 13.
See Toward a Constitutionally Protected Environment, supra note 45, at 479.
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However, the power given to the courts to judge the efficacy of
state action in various contexts does create a high potential for
direct conflicts between the courts on the one hand and the
agencies and the legislature on the other. The state has a vested
interest in some of the activities that will be challenged under the
Act, and it always has the option of evading the burdens imposed
on it by enacting new legislation either limiting the power of the
63
courts or specifically authorizing the activity in question.
Agencies charged with enforcing standards imposed by the courts
may resort to dillatory tactics or superficial compliance, leaving
the basic situation unchanged. The involvement of one branch of
government in the functions of another branch is a delicate operation, and the power of the courts to issue direct mandates
affecting internal activities of administrative agencies may threaten the traditional separation of powers.
The flexibility inherent in the provisions of the Act may also
work to the disadvantage of a plaintiff desirous of immediate
judicial intervention. The availability of remand to administrative
proceedings may make a court unwilling to make the initial determination, and ultimate adjudication could be delayed for a considerable period of time. An example of this is found in a recent
Michigan case, White Lake Improvement Association v. City of
Whitehall,6 4 involving the pollution of a lake by the dumping of
sewage. The Michigan Court of Appeals granted standing to the
plaintiffs and asserted concurrent jurisdiction with the Water Resources Commission, but, relying on the theory of primary jurisdiction, it remanded the case to the agency, stating:
To rule on the plaintiffs' cause of action would require a court
to duplicate the efforts of the water resources commission
and perhaps to contradict the agreements which, we have
observed, function as orders. In order to achieve uniformity
and consistency in this vital area, we think it would be wise
for the courts to refrain from ruling on the merits of the
association's claims at this time. 65
Although courts are now authorized under the Act to take prima6 See Ottinger, supra note 3, at 671. Equity and the Eco-Systen, supra note 12, at

1268:
Indeed, there is reason to suspect that the current wave of governmental

activism against polluters may waver somewhat and that even the present
inadequate level of regulation may be tempered as the conservation movement begins to interfere more significantly with American industry, for
American governmental institutions are resistant to changes which encroach
upon powerful vested interests.
6 22 Mich. App. 262 (1970).

6 22 Mich. App. at 281.

FALL

19701

Michigan Environmental Protection Act

ry jurisdiction, the reasoning of the Whitehall opinion could be
attractive to a court with an appropriate administrative proceeding
available for remand. However, a court may now consider all
relevant factors, including the need for immediate judicial action,
in reaching a decision on remanding a case.
E. Protectionof Indigents Under the Act
Another serious problem raised by a consideration of the potential functioning of the Act is the ability of indigents to assert
the invasion of their environmental interest. Pollution of the environment has been recognized as an infringement of a right enjoyed
by all the citizens, and yet its protection will be available only to
those able to afford the costs of litigation.6 6 Pursuit of a legal
remedy is unfortunately a costly process, and, consequently, economic discrimination is an inherent characteristic of the legal
system. In many types of private actions, because of the availability of legal assistance on a contingency fee basis, an indigent
plaintiff has equal opportunity to assert his rights, but an action
brought under the Act has no possibility of a money award,
making this type of arrangement impossible. Coupled with the fact
that low income neighborhoods with high population concentrations are often situated in areas of intense pollution, this aspect of
the applicability of the Act's protection seems inconsistent with
its underlying philosophy. The authorization of class actions may
serve to mitigate this effect (as might the fact that a suit could be
brought by someone living outside of the area), but the nature and
extent of the organization required for such an effort would probably make it the exception rather than the rule.
IV.

CONCLUSION

With the enactment of the Environmental Protection Act,
Michigan has made an important and innovative advance toward
the development of a comprehensive system of environmental
protection. By establishing a forum for its assertion, the Act
provides an alternative to reliance on legislative and administrative action for a full consideration of the public interest in
natural resources.
However, due to its inherent flexibility, it is difficult to predict
the practical functioning of the various provisions of the Act. This
flexibility, on the one hand, has the potential for allowing a realis"See Office of Communications of the United Church of Christ v. Federal Communications Commission, supra note 5, where one of the justifications for granting standing
was that the individuals involved had demonstrated a "sufficient interest" by being "willing
to shoulder the burdensome and costly procedures." 359 F.2d at 1005.
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tic response to environmental issues and the development of
significant standards. On the other hand, it could conceivably
result in a dispersal of energy and an effective negation of any
meaningful protection. For the Act to have maximum effect, it
will be essential that early cases brought under it be well defined
and supported by sufficient evidence to insure the orderly development of reasonable judicial standards.
-Susan Pearce

